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Abstract 
Over the last 30 years, Tanzania has taken different policy approaches towards the conservation of 
forests. Intriguingly, from the earlier integrated conservation and development approach to the ‘newer’ 
green economy, the idea that providing livelihood benefits is a key strategy for achieving conservation 
effectiveness has dominated. This one-dimensional conception of what ‘local people’ value and why 
precludes a clear understanding of substantive social justice considerations – what is being contested, 
why and by whom – when conflicts arise in policy implementation settings. Using a green economy 
project that addresses charcoal-driven forest loss in Kilosa, the paper examines a conflict between forest 
conservation and farming, and studies the variegated notions of justice that farmers express in relation 
to the conflict. The paper builds upon a developing strand in the political ecology literature, that of 
empirical analyses of rural people’s conceptions of justice in environmental conservation, to 
demonstrate the analytical and practical values of a multidimensional justice framework. Its main 
contribution lies in illustrating how the framework can help to assess and reframe environmental 
interventions, going beyond one-dimensional conceptions, to focus attention on the diverse ways in 
which justice can be recognised or denied, at different levels and in different ways, for different groups 
of people. Particularly, it highlights that context matters, as despite the distributional ‘success’ of the 
project, disregarded concerns over procedural dimensions and the recognition of justice led to farmer 
evictions, covert resistance and continued struggles over land compensation. This paper therefore 
underlines that being attentive to a range of justice dimensions can reveal locally valued and contested 
aspects of conservation, and can guide more equitable and more just environmental conservation. 
Keywords: conceptions of justice, charcoal-driven forest loss, forest conservation, multidimensional 
justice framework, political ecology, provision of livelihood benefits, social justice  
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1  Introduction 
In Tanzania, forested villages with no ‘formal’ land use plans have unreserved forests on village lands. 
Sungusia and Lund (2016) call such areas ‘open area forests’, a term commonly used for spare land 
employed for future communal or individual uses. The national Land Act of 1999 problematically 
categorises lands with open area forests as general land, defined as ‘all public land, which is not reserved 
land or village land, and includes unoccupied or unused village land’ (URT 1999: 24). General lands fall 
under the central government’s control. Ulaya Mbuyuni, a village in Kilosa, had open area forests. Its 
leadership governed all land uses (excluding timber harvesting) on open area forests. In the forests, few 
villagers obtained residential and farming lands legally (via a village committee and with the knowledge 
of the village assembly); many such lands were obtained illegally (via a powerful village chairperson and 
with the knowledge of the assembly).  
That changed in late 2012, when a green transformation initiative called the Sustainable Charcoal 
Project (SCP) brought three changes to the village’s resource governance. Funded by the Swiss Agency 
for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and implemented by the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group 
(TFCG), the initiative falls under the burgeoning ‘green economy’ agenda in the Global South, the 
execution of which is framed as enhanced environmental protection along with ‘modernised’ and 
changed access to and control over natural resources (Bergius and Buseth 2019). The first change was 
the development of its Village Land Use Plan (VLUP), which is central to the land governance system in 
Tanzanian villages (Huggins 2018). The second was the designation of a Village Land Forest Reserve 
(VLFR) and its Forest Management Units, which occupied 3,540 out of the 5,789 hectares – over 60 per 
cent – of the total village land. In the third change, new resource governance institutions were crafted, 
bringing in modernised mechanisms for managing people–forest interactions, such as locally elected 
resource committees, a forest users’ group and ‘sustainable’ tree harvesting practices. Two formulated 
local committees, the Village Natural Resources Committee (VNRC) and the Village Land Use 
Management Committee (VLUMC), were mandated duties to create and oversee rules to govern the 
interactions.  
On 3 December 2015, the VNRC exercised its power by giving written eviction notices to 48 farmers, 
categorised as forest encroachers in the reserve, who had earlier rejected the VNRC’s verbal eviction 
notices. The VNRC cited the national Forest Act of 2002, which prohibits residency and farming in 
designated forest reserves. The farmers had obtained their farmlands illegally. The VNRC set 30 August 
2016 as a final eviction date, which the farmers challenged at a magistrates’ court, demanding a 
deliberative space for their concerns. 
The above account gives just one example of ongoing struggles over social justice under a ‘green 
transformation agenda’ in the Global South (Buseth 2017). The Tanzanian ‘green transformation’ policy 
framing draws heavily on the green economy discourse – that technical and market-driven interventions 
provide the best policy solutions for addressing economic and environmental challenges, including 
those related to achieving sustainable development, by re-orienting agriculture, energy and 
environmental conservation towards so-called ‘green modernisation’ (Bergius and Buseth 2019). In 
terms of conservation, this approach often targets common-pool resources, such as forests in rural 
areas, for formal management for use in sustainable production (i.e. charcoal, crops) or for marketised 
conservation for use in Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes (Brockington and Ponte 2015; 
Buseth 2017). Despite an increased emphasis on foreign investment, finance and private-sector actors 
in bringing about ‘green transformations’, the role of local actors in green economy-aligned 
conservation tends to follow the older logic of the integrated conservation and development policy 
(ICDP) approach, ‘that providing livelihood benefits is a key strategy for achieving conservation 
effectiveness’ (Martin 2017: 130). However, the discourse of aggregate ‘livelihood benefits’ has a 
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‘flattening’ effect, glossing both power and knowledge differentials among stakeholder groups and 
masking tensions that can arise between different actors and organisations pursuing particular 
conservation and development agendas and those concerned with livelihoods, as in the conflict here 
between forest conservation and farming. In addition, it instrumentalises and homogenises ‘the 
community’. Thus, at the core of the tensions are concerns over one-dimensional conceptions of what 
‘local people’ value and why, conceptions often formulated by non-local actors. This approach precludes 
a clear understanding of substantive justice considerations – what is being contested, why and by whom 
– when conflicts arise in implementation settings.  
In response, critical analysts have called for a multidimensional conception of social justice to be placed 
at the centre of environmental conservation (Martin 2017; Schlosberg 2007; Walker 2010). A 
multidimensional social justice framework directs attention not only to unequal outcomes of 
environmental interventions along important axes of social difference, including gender, ethnicity and 
social class, but understands them through these intertwined justice dimensions: distributional justice; 
procedural justice; and contextual and recognitional justice (Dawson et al., 2018; Law et al., 2017; 
Martin, 2017; McDermott et al., 2013; Zafra-Calvo et al., 2017). The framework can help to assess and 
reframe interventions, going beyond technical and economic indicators, to focus attention on the 
diverse ways in which justice can be recognised or denied, at different levels and in different ways, for 
different groups of people, and thus can guide more equitable and just governance (Zafra-Calvo et al. 
2017). In this paper, I demonstrate the framework’s analytic and practical value by using it to analyse a 
common-pool resources governance regime that implements a charcoal greening initiative in rural 
Kilosa, Tanzania. 
Earlier discussions on the ICDP approaches emphasise utilitarian justice theories that prioritise 
aggregate conservation outcomes over the interests of the marginalised individual (Martin 2017; Sikor 
et al. 2014). These discussions employ a livelihood benefits discourse, one dominated by simplistic 
economic conceptions of local claims to conservation impacts. They conceive of justice only in 
distributional terms, i.e. who gets what under what principles (Schlosberg, 2007; Walker, 2010). An 
emerging strand in political ecology has recently applied the multidimensional framework to study 
conservation justice using empirical approaches (e.g. Fisher et al. 2018; He and Sikor 2015; Sikor et al. 
2014). Yet many of these accounts use this framework to demonstrate how pluralistic justice 
conceptions inform conservation practices within the dynamics of PES initiatives. Such initiatives 
constitute marketised conservation, following neoliberal logics of privatisation, marketisation and 
commodification (Fletcher and Büscher 2017). These initiatives differ from the ongoing green economy-
aligned conservation interventions in the Global South, which target common-pool resources in rural 
areas to institute formal management for use in sustainable production (Bergius and Buseth 2019; 
Buseth 2017). Thus, the literature contains relatively few analyses that apply the framework to explore 
conservation struggles within green economy interventions that target environmental resources for 
efficient use in sustainable production.  
Using the charcoal greening project as an empirical case, this paper therefore aims to fill the gap by 
answering these questions: (i) what conceptions of justice do rural individuals express, and why? And 
(ii), how do the expressed conceptions shape individuals’ responses to conservation interventions? My 
analysis of the project’s conservation–farming conflict illuminates how its utilitarian distributive justice 
conceptions run counter to local contexts and contradict some local ideas about justice, leading to the 
farmers’ removal, covert resistance and struggles over compensation. That is, despite social justice 
being a central feature of the ‘green economy’ discourse (UNEP 2011), in practice, its aligned 
interventions repeat the tendencies towards reproducing social injustices for the greater good, like the 
older ICDP approaches. This paper therefore argues that considering rural people’s multiple expressions 
of justice, in relation to uneven past and present socio-cultural and political conditions, exposes locally 
valued and contested conservation impacts. This allows for a richer understanding of their responses to 
the green economy-aligned conservation interventions and their outcomes. In practice, this 
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understanding can guide more equitable and just conservation, especially as the interventions 
increasingly target environmental resources critical for rural livelihoods. 
In the next section, the paper details the multidimensional justice framework. I then explain my 
methodology, followed by a description of the study site and context, outlining how a green 
transformation is made manifest. The paper’s results (Section 5) apply the framework to discuss how 
claims about justice are made at the local level, revealing site-specific struggles and tensions over 
justice. Finally, the paper reflects on this analysis’s contribution to the political ecology literature with a 
demonstration of the analytic and practical value of the framework within the ongoing green economy-
aligned conservation interventions, in calling for conservation that is more just. 
2  Applying a multidimensional justice framework to a charcoal 
‘greening’ initiative in Kilosa 
The multidimensional justice framework applied in this paper builds upon that of Martin (2017) and 
borrows insights and examples from Dawson et al. (2018), Law et al. (2017), McDermott et al. (2013), 
Sikor et al. (2014) and Zafra-Calvo et al. (2017). The framework accepts a case-based contextual 
approach to demonstrate how embracing multiple conceptions of justice could be key to developing 
and implementing socially just environmental conservation interventions. The case-based contextual 
approach confines itself to the claims, situations and positionalities of individuals (as opposed to 
communities), taking individuals as the subjects of inquiry (Martin, 2017). Its emphasis is on 
understanding justice conceptions that are important to individuals and on analysing how the 
conceptions shape individuals’ claims to their rights, and their responses to conservation interventions. 
The contrasting approach – the normative approach – tends to identify generalised principles of what 
is just and unjust in any given context (Martin, 2017). It adopts a utilitarian conception of justice that 
prioritises ‘societal outcomes over individual ones’ (Martin 2017: 11). As Sikor et al. (2014) note, the 
conception is inappropriate in contexts of environmental conservation in the Global South, due to 
pronounced inter- and intra-community socio-economic, cultural and political inequities. Under such 
settings, the conception, when applied, brushes aside pre-existing distributional, recognitional and 
procedural inequities, leading to the displacement of disadvantaged people and their exclusion from 
access to resources (e.g. Fisher et al. 2018).  
The livelihood benefits discourse tends to follow utilitarian distributive conceptions that assume 
conservation actions to be right in principle, as long as the majority are happy and their welfare is 
improving – even when the rights of some individuals are disregarded (Martin 2017; Sikor et al. 2014). 
The discourse dominates in environmental justice discussions, particularly those applying generalised 
notions of justice. In the discourse, justice is exclusively defined as a question of equity in the 
distribution of social goods (Schlosberg 2007; Walker 2010). It often carries promises of substantial 
future economic and livelihood benefits, i.e. an ‘economy of expectations’ (Fletcher et al. 2016: 674). 
He and Sikor (2015) show that in the discourse, conservation actors, across local to national scales, 
usually share a primary concern with how conservation costs and benefits are justly distributed, despite 
prevailing differences in their understanding of justice. The discourse adopts a conception that fairness 
is defined as a just distribution of goods and bads (Schlosberg 2007). This narrow conception precludes 
the multifaceted relations within societies and between environmental resources and people; thus, it 
hides forms of inequities that are not defined in distributional terms (Walker 2010). These critical 
analysts do not disregard distributive justice; they rather emphasise that livelihood benefits alone 
cannot influence conservation effectiveness, as the benefits and their distributive patterns should be 
thoroughly understood in relation to other locally valued interests of fair capability, procedure and 
recognition (e.g. Martin 2017).  
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The multidimensional framework therefore introduces a multifaceted approach to justice based on a 
thorough understanding of its distributive, procedural and recognitional dimensions. The distributive 
dimension is concerned with the sharing of conservation impacts and responsibilities between different 
individuals and groups; the procedural deals with inclusions and exclusion in environmental decision-
making; finally, the recognitional concerns respect and disrespect for difference and the avoidance of 
domination. I draw on Martin’s (2017) framework to make sense of these diverse justice dimensions. 
The framework’s pluralistic conception assumes that context matters and that therefore no universal 
justice principles can generate an ethical consensus in all cases to resolve questions about just 
distribution, procedure and recognition (Martin, 2017). This assumption necessitates a thorough 
understanding of the contextual dimension of justice. However, in the literature, this contextual 
dimension is often disregarded or taken as part of recognition. Following Law et al. (2017) and Dawson 
et al. (2018), I consider it an independent dimension. I here incorporate McDermott’s et al. (2013) 
explanation. For McDermott and colleagues, the contextual dimension concerns past and present socio-
cultural conditions (beliefs, institutions, power dynamics and ethnicity) that define what is right or 
wrong. Schlosberg (2007) categorises this dimension as capability; it is focused on individual agency and 
functioning in the context of a given society. It normally considers the uneven playing fields that the 
conditions create, when examining differences in people’s abilities to be recognised, participate in 
decision-making and lobby for just distribution (Law et al. 2017; McDermott et al. 2013; Schlosberg 
2007). Such conditions often define what is required or not required to enable or constrain the pursuit 
of socially just conservation (Zafra-Calvo et al., 2017). Table 1 below summarises these dimensions and 
their characteristics. 
Table 1. The characteristics of multidimensional social justice  
Justice dimension Characteristics 
Recognition Recognises and respects diverse actors, their identities, interests, aspirations and values 
Recognises and respects marginalised groups  
Procedural Chances to participate and influence decision-making 
Fulfilment of commitments made by resources institutions 
Fairness in rule-making and enforcement 
Fairness in political processes that allocate resources and resolve disputes 
Clearly defined and agreed responsibilities of actors 
Distributive Fair sharing of conservation burdens and benefits 
Equitable distribution of rights and responsibilities 
Mitigates any costs to marginalised groups through compensation or alternative resources 
Contextual Considers broad social, governance, economic and cultural contexts, past and present 
Considers power imbalances among the actors 
Recognises the variegated capabilities of individuals to participate in decision-making 
processes, influence decisions and capture benefits 
Sources: Author, based on Dawson et al. (2018), Law et al. (2017), Martin (2017), McDermott et al. (2013) and 
Zafra-Calvo et al. (2017). 
 
The framework shows that environmental justice struggles are deeply contextual. In contrast to the 
utilitarian conceptions, what is sought here is a contextual grounding in identifying local justice claims 
based on claimants’ positionalities, and their past and present socio-cultural and political situations. 
McDermott et al. (2013) note that claimants’ positionalities and the underlying situations can 
(re)produce inequities in the other three dimensions, as they may create inequalities in: (i) the 
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distribution of conservation benefits, rights and responsibilities; (ii) being heard, i.e. actively 
participating and influencing decision-making; and (iii) demanding recognition of claimants’ aspirations, 
interests and values in the political process. Claims and their associated justice framings are usually 
unevenly persuasive, as due to existing differences in power and social identities, some become more 
noticeable while others are concealed. In conservation interventions, it is thus common to find some 
claims being supported as morally right, and others encountering substantial disapproval (Fisher et al. 
2018; He and Sikor 2015). For instance, in two carbon forestry projects in Uganda, people demanded 
that their cultural linkages with the forest and the historical (contextual) colonial and post-colonial 
processes of land alienation be recognised. They received little attention from local authorities, who 
were more concerned with the creation of employment opportunities (Fisher et al. 2018). However, 
what is morally right or wrong within the interventions is defined by universal conceptions about what 
constitutes justice and injustice (Martin, 2017). But local people’s justice claims are endogenous, as they 
are shaped by past and present socio-cultural and political situations (He and Sikor 2015). The 
framework and its case-based contextual approach thus emphasise the importance of empirically 
grounded observations of how justice conceptions are conceived and applied in practice, when dealing 
with real-world conservation problems, such as the conflict between forest conservation and farming 
in rural Kilosa. 
The recent literature advances concerns over social justice in greening1 interventions in the Global South 
(Barkin and Fuente 2013; Fisher et al. 2018; He and Sikor 2015; Scoones et al. 2015). Scoones et al. 
(2015: 3) boldly argue that ‘In many, perhaps especially developing country contexts, there is unlikely 
to be any green transformations if questions of social justice are not part of the debate’. Barkin and 
Fuente (2013) analyse contrasting justice logics differing between local people and advocates of the 
greening of the forestry sector in Mexico; Fisher et al. (2018) examine notions of justice that local people 
express in two contrasting PES initiatives in Uganda; while He and Sikor (2015) study justice notions 
embedded in state policy and those held by villagers and local state officials in China, and how villagers’ 
notions shape their reactions to a state forest greening programme. He and Sikor note how a primary 
concern for distributive rather than procedural and recognitional justice produces a positive reaction 
among villagers to the livelihood benefits that the programme provides. Meanwhile, Fisher et al. (2018) 
empirically derive justice notions in the two carbon forestry projects to produce a fuller understanding 
of local people’s reactions to the projects and their outcomes. Therefore, it is the associations between 
rural people’s variegated conceptions of justice and how the conceptions influence their justice claims 
and responses to greening interventions – which target environmental resources for efficient use in 
sustainable production – that I explore in the sections below. 
3  Methodology 
The information for this analysis comes from a range of ethnographic methods carried out during seven 
months of fieldwork (April to September 2016, and January 2017); I lived in the village from June to 
early September 2016. The primary methods of data generation were: semi-structured interviews in the 
form of expert and key informant interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) and participant 
observation. I conducted expert interviews with: the Kilosa district’s forest manager; SCP’s field officers; 
SCP’s technical adviser; and SDC’s programme officer. I conducted 32 informant interviews with: 
farmers; charcoal makers; and selected members of the village council, natural resources and land 
management committees. I undertook four FGDs with charcoal producers, and with members of the 
village council, natural resources and land management committees to understand the on-the-ground 
 
1 Here the term ‘greening’ indicates actual implementation of policy processes and practices that respect 
environmental limits and end the systematic exploitation of nature (Leach 2015). 
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background contexts and insights, explore how local resource users talk about the functioning of SCP 
and VNRC, and compare the experts’ insights with the locals’. 
I participated as an observer in two closed meetings: a special farmers’ meeting that had the eviction as 
one of the agendas; and charcoal producers’ workshop with SCP’s officials, which discussed strategies 
to meet SDC’s conditions for continued financial support to the project. I also shadowed two events in 
the village: the allocation by the VNRC of charcoal plots to registered producers; and the summoning by 
the village executive officer, sub-village chairpersons and VNRC and VLUMC members of the alleged 
forest encroachers (farmers) to explain their cultivation in the forest reserve, and their refusal to accept 
the eviction notices. As a participant observer, I viewed ‘each moment as an opportunity for both data 
gathering and reflection, not knowing what will ultimately be important’ (Corson et al. 2014: 24). I 
occasionally employed reflexive analysis (Burawoy 2003) by positioning gathered data against theories, 
and by developing further questions to explore. Appendix A has a list of all research participants and 
methods used. 
I used ethnographic methods ‘to be sufficiently grounded in context so as to be able to draw informed 
distinctions’ (Corson et al. 2014: 24). I therefore do not generalise the empirical results of the case, but 
report insights from rural Kilosa. I argue that political ecology discussions on social justice within green 
economy understate the importance of including a multidimensional conception of justice. The goal is 
then ‘to produce knowledge that reveals where existing theory falls short of explaining social 
phenomenon, and then modify it accordingly’ (Corson et al. 2014: 24). I thus provide theoretical 
generalisation (Lewis and Ritchie, 2003), as I introduce empirical insights generated from rural Kilosa 
that are of wider significance to the political ecology literature on socially just environmental 
conservation. 
4  The case: SCP in Kilosa 
This study focused on Ulaya Mbuyuni village. This has six sub-villages, comprising a total of 3,473 people. 
According to SCP field officers in Kilosa, it is one of the earliest and most successful villages to implement 
charcoal greening in the woodlands.2 It is composed of mixed ethnicities: Sagara, Kaguru, Bena, Yao, 
Ngindo, Pogoro, Gogo, Hehe, Sukuma, Ha and Ndendeule. The majority of the residents are farmers – 
81.2% (UVC 2012). The villagers produce charcoal as a by-product when clearing new farmlands, and as 
an alternative income-generating activity during the off-farm season. This makes ‘traditional’ charcoal-
making a secondary livelihood strategy and land-use practice, one which is often cited as an 
unsustainable and a major driver of deforestation in Kilosa (Forrester-Kibuga and Samweli 2010; 
Mugasha and Katani 2016).  
This perspective on charcoal-making as a driver of deforestation is dominant in Tanzanian forest policies 
(Doggart and Meshack 2017). However, as charcoal production tends to consist of temporary clearing 
of all standing forest biomass, rather than long-term loss of forest cover, charcoal-making is linked to 
degradation more than deforestation (Mwampamba et al., 2013). However, the TFCG still framed 
charcoal as the driver when they made a proposal for greening charcoal production in the woodlands 
to the SDC (TFCG, 2011). The TFCG undertook a forest change study to depict the deforestation history 
in the village (see Table 2). According to the study, most of the deforestation has taken place on 
unreserved forests on the village land, i.e. open area forest. This is where most farmers practice both 
 
2 Miombo is a Tanzanian Nyamwezi name for Brachystegia boehmii, which was later used by the Germans to 
describe woodlands dominated by trees of the genera Brachystegia and Julbernardia. Miombo woodlands are 
characterised by low diversity of canopy tree species and high species richness of the flora, and are maintained by 
frequent dry-season fires and grazing regimes (Chidumayo 2017). 
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cultivation and charcoal-making, and is an area where struggles over access and justice are made 
manifest. 
Table 2. A short history of forest change in Ulaya Mbuyuni village 
Forest change 2007–10 (hectares) 2010–14 (hectares) 2014–15 (hectares) 
Forest loss in the village 
forest 
228.69 375.84 21.78 
Forest loss in the village 
forest reserve 
143.28 244.53 13.5 
Source: TFCG forest change data 
 
Deforestation contributes around 6–17 per cent of global anthropogenic CO2 emissions (Baccini et al. 
2012). As tropical forests are increasingly becoming sources of CO2 (Baccini et al. 2017), tackling 
deforestation ‘is seen as one of the low-hanging fruit that can be targeted rapidly to reduce carbon 
emissions’ (Brockington and Ponte 2015: 2198). Along these lines, the TFCG implements the SCP with 
the goal of discontinuing ‘business-as-usual’ traditional charcoal production practices (TFCG 2011). The 
TFCG implements the SCP with a green transformation vision. The vision is to increase wood utilisation 
efficiency, and thus minimise wood loss, through improved basic earth-mound kilns, installed in the 
designated charcoal Forest Management Units. The vision is paired with a 24-year coppicing rotation 
system, selective cutting practices, and cutting trees at knee height (~50 cm) to leave behind a stump 
and the roots, all designed to enhance tree regeneration within the woodlands. The vision aligns with 
Tanzania’s green transformation agenda, which puts forests at the heart of a green economy (UNEP 
2015). The policy practices aim to have cleaner and more stable forests, i.e. to reduce forest and wood 
loss; the SCP epitomises such practices. The VNRCs, established in each of the eight implementing 
villages (see Figure 1 below) supervise this process, within the existing Community Based Forest 
Management framework (see Blomley and Iddi 2009 for an overview).  
The SCP began by identifying village land uses and establishing by-laws for land governance through a 
village land use planning (UVC 2012). It created the VNRC, the members of which are elected at the 
assembly, as a responsible institution to govern land affairs in the forests, giving it the ability to act on 
villagers’ behalf. Village land falls into three categories: communal for public utilities; individual for a 
person, family or group of persons (URT 1999); and spare for future communal or individual use (Locher 
2016). A VLUP was produced during the process, which the majority of villagers endorsed at the village 
assembly (UVC 2012). As the public space for resident adult villagers (over 18 years old) to ‘discuss the 
conduct and the decisions of the village leadership’ (Greco 2016: 24), the assembly is the supreme 
authority over village affairs (URT 1982). The Village Land Act sees planning as a participatory process, 
whereby local users identify land uses and participate in relevant decisions (URT 1999). However, as 
Huggins (2018) notes, in practice, local elites dominate the process, furthering their own agendas, which 
in some contexts are in conflict with rural people’s livelihoods and conceptions of justice, as I show in 
this analysis.  
   
 
 
 
8 
 
Figure 1. Map showing the SCP project villages in Kilosa district. Credit: This map was produced by 
TFCG for the SCP Project. 
In relation to the ongoing greening agenda for ‘natural forests’, the SCP adopts a utilitarian logic that 
prioritises aggregate outcomes to justify conservation actions that serve the greater societal good, 
particularly in terms of future economic and livelihood benefits. Over the last 30 years of forest policy 
formulation and implementation in Tanzania, promises of livelihood benefits have been a key discursive 
commodity that decision makers and practitioners have used to validate their next ‘silver bullet’ to 
address socio-ecological problems (Lund et al. 2017).  
As a recent community-based resource management scheme, the SCP in Ulaya Mbuyuni presents an 
interesting context to examine how newer green economy-aligned conservation tends to follow the 
older logics of the ICDP approach, and what such continuity implies for justice. Particularly, it 
demonstrates how the discourse of aggregate livelihood benefits precludes a clear understanding of 
substantive social justice considerations, when conservation collides with people’s livelihoods – and 
why and how the multidimensional justice framework can be analytically and practically valuable in the 
pursuit of socially just environmental conservation.  
5  Notions and claims of justice in the greening initiative 
5.1 ‘Livelihood benefits’ and project acceptance 
In the Global South, green economy-aligned conservation interventions carry promises of livelihood 
benefits alongside environmental protection (e.g. Bergius and Buseth 2019; Fisher et al. 2018; Lund et 
al. 2017). The same applies to the charcoal greening and forest conservation initiative in Ulaya Mbuyuni. 
According to an informant, during the SCP introductory meetings, the majority of villagers accepted the 
project, the VLUP and its land use categories, following two promises given. First, farmers with lands 
inside the designated VLFR would receive land compensation, and those with makazi mashamba (pieces 
of land that combine both farmlands and settlements on the same plot) could remain in the VLFR as 
long as they did not clear new farmlands. ‘We were told that we can remain in the forest to be the 
village’s informants and guards against illegal forest access,’ one farmer said (participant observation, 
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15 August 2016). They were promised that the forest conservation that the greening initiative intended 
to achieve could take place amid their farming activities. The SCP field officers told them that it was 
possible to have forest patches that would cumulatively establish the VLFR, an informant noted 
(interview, 28 August, 2016). Second, as an aggregate societal benefit, the village would retain 100% of 
the charcoal revenues for community development initiatives and forest management (FGD, 10 August 
2016). One charcoal producer said, ‘The goal of producing charcoal is for me to get profits, and the 
village too’ (interview, 26 August 2018). Charcoal producers noted that they were being incentivised to 
agree to the project to promote forest conservation with the promise that they would earn sustainable 
livelihoods and generate village revenue (FGD, 10 August 2016). Such voices of environmentalism are 
typical in Tanzanian villages (Brockington, 2005). 
Furthermore, the experiences of neighbouring villages with livelihood benefits were key to the initial 
acceptance of the project. Villagers had confused the SCP with REDD+3 initiatives. In those villages, TFCG 
was piloting REDD+ as part of Tanzania’s trial engagement (see Lund et al. 2017). Villagers heard that 
the TFCG gave trial REDD+ payments in the form of individual dividends to all registered residents in 
those villages. The TFCG used the same vehicles in its project villages; these had its logos and a sticker 
with words, ‘Making REDD Work for Communities and Forest Conservation in Tanzania’. This caused 
Ulaya Mbuyuni villagers to visualise ‘REDD+ benefits’ in their lives and village, as several informants said. 
In its 13 REDD+ villages in Kilosa, the TFCG promised income-generating such as improved agricultural 
practices, beekeeping, chicken-rearing and sustainable charcoal-making (Vatn et al. 2017). In addition, 
it had other SCP villages in Kilosa (see Figure 1), where Ulaya Mbuyuni villagers heard about charcoal 
revenues and a reduction in villagers’ cash contributions for village development initiatives. One 
informant said that Ulaya Mbuyuni has a history of coercive monetary collections for its development 
initiatives (interview, 24 August 2016). This is typical of Tanzanian villages (see Brockington, 2008; 
Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2001). One informant noted that such experiences and promises of future 
livelihood benefits moved most villagers towards project acceptance (interview, 26 August 2016). 
In these cases, the VNRC was an agent of the aggregate livelihood benefits discourse. TFCG officials 
taught members of the VNRC about the project’s goals: producing charcoal sustainably; forest 
conservation; generating village revenues; and collective sharing of conservation benefits (interview, 31 
May 2016). As the knowledge broker, the VNRC spoke at village gatherings about the benefits that the 
village would obtain. Several informants spoke about how communal conservation benefits were 
emphasised, while discounting the risks and costs associated with project implementation to 
individuals. In some discussions, discussants noted that the promises of collective benefits made most 
villagers unsympathetic towards those who had settlements and farmlands inside the designated VLFR. 
During participant observation at various VNRC activities, I heard members employing the utilitarian 
thinking that for the good of the current and future community, the forest must be protected from the 
degradation that settlers and farmers inside the VLFR supposedly caused. They justified the labelling of 
the settlers and farmers as encroachers, and the intention to remove them, based on the notion that 
the SCP brought greater societal good from charcoal revenues to fund communal development 
initiatives. And they noted that through the initiatives, the equitable sharing of conservation benefits 
could be realised.  
Until June 2018, TZS 158,557,4294 has been generated as tariffs from charcoal sales. In productive 
Community Based Forest Management schemes, VNRCs usually receive 40% and village development 
initiatives 60% of the total forest revenues (e.g. Sungusia and Lund 2016). In Ulaya Mbuyuni, the VNRC 
oversees the administration and distribution of all revenues; it gets 60% of the revenues, while the 
 
3 REDD+ refers to the global policy mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, 
plus the role of conservation, sustainable forest management, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in 
developing countries (Lund et al. 2017). 
4 As per the Bank of Tanzania’s forex rates of 28 March 2019, USD 1 is equivalent to TZS 2,278. 
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remaining 40% goes on communal development projects. Table 3 below summarises the initiatives 
funded.  
Table 3. Village development initiatives funded by charcoal revenues 
Initiative Funds received (in TZS) Completion stage 
Constructing two primary school 
classrooms and a teachers’ office 
32,566,000 Ongoing  
Contributing to the costs of 
laboratory construction for the 
secondary school 
4,250,000 Completed 
Covering one year of health 
insurance for every resident 
4,250,000 Completed 
Constructing a well 19,280,000 Completed  
Budgeting for the construction of a 
dispensary  
10,000,000 Ongoing  
Source: Fieldwork data 
However, those settlers and farmers mobilised several villagers and questioned the practicality of 
utilitarian distributive justice. Three aspects were involved. First, they built on the realisation that 
REDD+ is unrelated to the SCP. In a neighbouring village of Chabima, the REDD+ trial payment per 
household was about USD 46; in other project villages, the payment was around USD 40 (Vatn et al. 
2017). Several informants spoke of being disappointed with the SCP due to the realisation there are no 
individual dividends in their village. Second, there were discontents with the health insurance cover. 
Due to the deficient medical services at a private dispensary, villagers perceived the insurance cover as 
a waste of money. Several informants noted the difficulties they had experienced in using their medical 
insurance at the dispensary. They recounted that many common diagnoses, treatments and medicines 
were not covered by the insurance at the dispensary. They are asked to pay in cash. The villagers then 
agreed to set a budget to construct their own dispensary, which will cost TZS 38,000,000. So far, TZS 
10,000,000 has been allocated. 
Third, there are growing feelings that only charcoal producers and VNRC members benefit from the 
greening initiative at the individual level. In closed meetings or seminars that the TFCG or VNRC 
organises, each participant receives an allowance of TZS 5,000. In addition, the VNRC’s secretary and 
treasurer each get a monthly allowance of TZS 70,000. Every member also receives TZS 10,000 as an 
allowance for forest patrols, carried out twice a month, and TZS 5,000 for a monthly VNRC meeting 
(interview, 23 August 2016). Producers too receive TZS 5,000 whenever the TFCG organises learning 
workshops for charcoal production (participant observation, 16 August 2016). There are 80 registered 
producers, 45 of them active, based on the yearly allocation of production plots inside the VLFR 
(interview, 27 August 2016). In 2016–17, 54 plots were provided. On average, a producer makes 50 
charcoal sacks – 50 kg each – from a 50x50m2 plot. With an average price sack of TZS 12,000, a producer 
can generate TZS 600,000 during the off-farm season – July to October, the active production period 
(FGD, 10 August 2016). If there are open plots, any producer is eligible to receive more than one plot 
per year, and thus generate more revenue (interview, 28 August 2016). Dokken and Angelsen (2015) 
show that mean annual total household income is about USD 371 in rural Kilosa. These few individuals 
are thus fairly well off compared to the majority of the villagers. The disappointments and growing 
perceptions of unfair benefit distribution have made it easier for the settlers and farmers to regain the 
villagers’ sympathy and make their case vis-à-vis the conflict.  
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5.2 The contextual dimension to the forest conservation–farming conflict 
‘[R]ecently, some villagers received eviction notices, demanding them to get out of 
their lands where they used to live and farm. The notices claim that they have 
invaded lands that are part of the village forest. This is something that is not right, 
to call your own villagers invaders, while they have been there before the project. 
We fail to understand this; has the project come to harass villagers or to help 
them?’  
A passage from a letter dated 17.01.2016 that Ulaya Mbuyuni farmers wrote to 
their Village Executive Officer 
In the discussions with members of the village council – a village political board of a maximum of 25 
locally elected representatives – villagers painted the VNRC as the most powerful committee in the 
village. Table 3 below summarises its powers and roles in the SCP. I then discuss how they are made 
manifest in the conflict. 
Table 4. The VNRC’s roles and powers in the SCP 
Site of manifestation Roles and powers 
In the village’s office Receiving and evaluating applications for charcoal production 
Registering accepted producers 
Granting forest entrance permits 
Issuing certificates of admission for infraction and penalties 
Rewarding any villager who reports on forest infractions 
Resolving disputes in relation to forest management 
At the village assembly Providing quarterly reports on forest revenues and expenditure 
Delivering promises of aggregate livelihood benefits 
Educating villagers on sustainable forest use practices 
Inside the VLFR Allocating charcoal-making plots to registered producers 
Carrying out forest patrols, twice a month 
Source: Fieldwork data 
As a result, on 3 December 2015, the VNRC wrote a letter to each of the 48 farmers, referred to as 
‘invaders’ (as in the passage quoted above). In total, there were 64 farmers cultivating inside the 
designated VLFR: 29 farmers living and farming inside the VLFR; and 35 farmers farming in the VLFR, but 
living in the village (interview, 28 August 2016). The letter’s heading was ‘Ban notice on farming and 
settlement inside the Ulaya Mbuyuni village land forest reserve’. Its content is reproduced here: 
Refer to the heading above. 
From today, the Ulaya Mbuyuni village natural resources committee is giving a ban 
notice that from 30 August 2016 it is prohibited for anyone to have settlements, or 
farming activities inside the area of Ulaya Mbuyuni’s village land forest reserve.  
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In case anyone will not adhere to this notice, strict legal measures will be taken 
against that person, including being sent to court for further legal sanctions. 
A local magistrates’ court advised the VNRC to write the letters, according to a committee member, 
when the VNRC opened a case against those who had rejected verbal notices (interview, 23 August 
2016). Signing the letter meant accepting removal from the land, which was now the VLFR. The VNRC’s 
chairperson and secretary, the village chairperson, and the village executive officer were the supervisory 
authority, witnesses and signees. At the court, the VNRC labelled settlements and farmlands inside the 
VLFR as encroachments. It referred to the Forest Act of 2002. Section 26 (a–s) of the Act mentions 
activities prohibited within forest reserves without permission from an existing right holder (in this case, 
the VNRC on behalf of the village). Erecting residential buildings or other structures, clearing land for 
cultivation, sowing crops and livestock grazing are among the prohibited activities (URT 2002). Using the 
Act, the VNRC identified as ‘invaders’ the 29 farmers with makazi mashamba and the 35 farmers only 
farming inside the VLFR. The VNRC told the local magistrate that it first issued a verbal ban and removal 
notices to the farmers: 16 farmers, mostly from those who lived and farmed inside the reserve, 
departed; 48 farmers rejected the notices.  
One contextual aspect that the VNRC and the broad SCP project overlooked (intentionally or not), which 
caused the conflict to emerge, was the preceding land allocation system. As noted earlier, Ulaya 
Mbuyuni had unreserved forests on its land. It had about 3,540 hectares of open area forest (see Table 
5). The country’s forestry policy community often labels open area forests as ‘open access’, in the sense 
that they are under heavy pressure for conversion to other land uses (such as farming, livestock grazing 
settlements and ‘unsustainable’ wood utilisation). However, villagers see open area forests as spare 
lands for future communal or individual land uses, such as investments, expansion of farmlands and 
settlements. The 64 farmers used the open area forest for settlements and farmlands. The Village Land 
Act of 1999 grants the village council authority over village land, on behalf of the village assembly (URT 
1999). Section 8(4) of the Act allows the council to establish a committee to advise it on village land 
management. Section 8(5) instructs that the council cannot allocate land or grant right of occupancy 
without the prior approval of the assembly (URT 1999).  
Table 5. Land use categories before and after SCP 
Land use category Size before SCP (hectares) Size after SCP (hectares) Change (hectares) 
Housing and settlement 67 86 +19 
Agriculture 4,084.5 2,065 -2,019.5 
Makazi mashamba 1,642.1 32 -1,610.1 
Grazing 0 18 +18 
Forest reserve 0 3,540 +3,540 
 Source: Ulaya Mbuyuni’s 2012–32 VLUP 
However, prior to the project and the development of the VLUP, the village had an illegal land allocation 
system, which was based on the powers of one former village chairperson. Historically, the first ethnic 
groups to settle in a land occupied a higher social stratum in Kilosa (Beidelman 1978). The firstcomers 
classified all ethnic groups that came later as outsiders. They had the authority to accept or reject the 
outsiders, and their land use, and established themselves as more entitled to village resources 
(Beidelman 1978). The Sagara was the first ethnic group to settle. Discussions with some elders revealed 
that the Sagara claimed political authority over land resources; latecomers had to recognise the Sagara’s 
ritual authority over the land. The former village chairperson is affiliated to the Sagara. His ethnic 
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affiliation also ties him to powers of sorcery. In many Tanzanian societies, sorcery beliefs are profound 
and pervasive (Mesaki, 1993). In Kilosa, it is always assumed that pioneer settlers possess the strongest 
sorcery powers from ancestral ghosts, and a mystical connection with the land (Beidelman 1971). In 
addition, his wife is a mganga wa kienyeji (a local healer). Local healers are feared and believed to 
possess sorcery powers too, as they can cleanse someone from witchcraft (Mesaki 1993).  
Following this history, the former chairperson created his own land allocation system in the open area 
forest. The system was illegal as it did not go through a village land committee and receive villagers’ 
endorsement at the assembly, as the Village Land Act instructs. And it did not fall under the 
statutory/customary hybrid law (Locher 2016). The 48 farmers, all latecomers, obtained their lands5 
through the chairperson. One informant said that an allocation was made between the chairperson and 
a villager needing land; the chairperson used a village seal to stamp an allocation agreement on a piece 
of paper (interview, 18 August 2016). Several informants said that he used his ethnic affiliation and the 
attached powers to allocate land illegally and unchallenged. For villagers and village council’s members 
who attempted to challenge him, he used ‘threatening’ words such as ‘I will deal with you’ and/or ‘You 
cannot do anything to me’. The informants said that the words connoted threats of causing harm 
through sorcery. Knowing that witchcraft is an inherently endowed power to harm and a means of doing 
evil (Mesaki 1993), villagers and other village leaders remained submissive to the chairperson and his 
land allocation system, as an informant narrated (interview, 28 August 2016). Thus, all of these gave 
him structural power over land governance, the kind of power that adversely affects the ‘beneficiaries’ 
of the system, today under the SCP, as I illustrate in the following section. 
5.3 Farmers’ perspectives on the conflict  
Several farmers signed the ban and removal letters, and others refused. On 15 August 2016, a special 
village inquiry was organised for the farmers who had refused to sign. During the inquiry, under pressure 
from the supervisory authority, one farmer signed the letter (participant observation, 15 August 2016). 
However, others still did not sign. In this section, I explain the farmers’ logics in addition to the earlier 
concerns noted over the stated utilitarian benefit-sharing mechanism.  
The farmers questioned the political process under which their removal was taking place. ‘The VNRC 
has no authority to remove a villager from a land’, one farmer lamented (interview, 23 August 2016). 
The farmers questioned the VNRC’s authority over a villager’s land occupancy. At the inquiry, when 
asked why they had not signed the notice, two farmers responded as follows: 
I have not signed the notice, because it has been prepared and written by the committee [the 
VNRC], which has no authority for removing a villager from anywhere. If the village council had 
written the notice, then I would have signed. (Farmer 1; participant observation, 15 August 
2016) 
The committee has written the eviction notice, even using its letterhead. But I got my land from 
the village government through the [former] village chairperson. So, if I sign this eviction notice, 
where will I go to claim my right? (Farmer 2; participant observation, 15 August 2016) 
 
5 These lands are located on the village’s margins. In the view of the firstcomers, the lands were not fertile, were 
good for no more than one or two years of farming and required formidable labour to clear. Farming in such lands 
is completely rainfed. Firstcomers own valley gardens, which they cultivate even when there are no rains. So, for 
the firstcomers, lands in the open area forest has no economic significance. The latecomers lacked land, so they 
cultivated these. 
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When I asked one farmer why he had not signed the notice, he responded: ‘I told them [the VNRC], you 
[the VNRC] do not have authority to remove me [from the land inside the now VLFR]. The village 
[former] chairperson has such authority, as he allocated the land to me’ (interview, 23 August 2016). 
The farmers did not accept the VNRC’s authority over their land occupancy. In fact, the Forest Act, the 
national Community Based Forest Management guidelines, and the 1982 Local Government (District 
Authorities) Act, and even the VLUP vest all executive powers over village affairs and ownership of land 
resources to the village council on villagers’ behalf (MNRT, 2007; URT, 2002; URT, 1982; UVC, 2012). 
Regarding forest management, the Forest Act notes that the VNRC works on the council’s behalf (URT, 
2002). The farmers doubted the VNRC’s legal justification for the removal from village land, an aspect 
that falls under the council’s authority. One farmer went further, even doubting the VNRC’s legality in 
writing the notice, suggesting that its tenure was already over: ‘Even the eviction notices that they [the 
VNRC] have provided are not valid’ (interview, 23 August 2016). The tenure is three years; then new 
members must be elected. When asked about this, one VNRC leader noted that at that time the village 
had no leadership, as the village chairperson had been suspended because of corruption allegations 
over the well initiative. As a result, the village could not hold an election, as there was no village 
leadership to officially call for the village assembly. Yet it was true that the VNRC had exceeded its tenure 
limit. 
Furthermore, the farmers questioned the fairness over the enforcement of forest management rules. 
At the special farmers’ meeting, the farmers doubted the VNRC’s fairness, citing how it failed to deal 
with the Maasai’s livestock invasions in the VLFR (participant observation, 16 January 2017). 
Benjaminsen et al. (2009) note, as Maasai pastoralists are a minority in Kilosa, they compensate by 
bribing local officials. ‘Put simply, herders have the wealth to bribe officials’, Brockington (2005: 108) 
notes. However, it is difficult to find evidence for bribing activities (see Brockington 2005). Yet local 
narratives suggest that pastoralists sell their livestock for cash to bribe officials (participant observation, 
16 January 2017). This creates what farmers call an ‘unequal playing field’, as they do not have quick 
access to cash as do pastoralists. 
The farmers also reminded the VNRC and the broadly SCP about two earlier commitments: (a) that they 
could remain inside the VLFR as long as they did not clear new land; and (b) that they would receive 
land compensation. They thus questioned the fulfilment of the commitments. As noted in Section 5.1, 
the farmers were promised that it was possible to remain inside the reserve, as the greening initiative 
could take the forest patches that would cumulatively make up the VLFR, an informant noted (interview, 
28 August 2016). Another informant said that they the farmers even raised this concern at the 
magistrates’ court (interview, 23 August 2016). The compensation commitment was the more widely 
expressed. A total of 3,629 hectares of cultivation land were lost to the VLFR (see Table 5). Section 8(2) 
of the Village Land Act states that no village land shall be transferred until ‘the type, amount, method, 
and timing of the payment of compensation has been agreed upon’ (URT 1999: 30). There are three 
contextual aspects of interest here, which the farmers expressed.  
The first concerns the ‘legality’ of their land ownership in the open area forest, and the transparency of 
the allocation process and its implications for eligibility to compensation. Section 6(a) of the Act 
stipulates that whenever there is a transfer and allocation of village land (<250 hectares) to a villager or 
a group of villagers, the village council shall inform the village assembly so it may approve or refuse the 
grant (URT 1999). However, as I noted earlier (Section 5.2), the village had an illegal land allocation 
system. A former village chairperson used his higher social stratum – as a ‘first settler’ – to run the 
system. It is the village land committee established under Section 8(4) of the Act and the assembly that 
are responsible to govern land allocations of <250 hectares in the village (URT, 1999). Nevertheless, the 
former chairperson allocated lands on his own. He took advantage of an influx of migrants into the 
village in the early- to mid-2000s, using the influx as a rent-seeking opportunity, and thus allocating 
farmlands and settlements inside the open area forest (now the VLFR), without following allocation 
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procedures, an informant narrated (interview, 25 August 2016). He provided no acceptable ‘legal’ 
documentation to prove the land occupancies of his victims – the evicted farmers and settlers. Another 
informant recounted that the allocation process was not transparent, as the chairperson never disclosed 
the allocations to the land committee, council or assembly (interview, 28 August 2016).  
Greco (2016) claims that this tendency is common with individuals from village governments in rural 
Tanzania. She links the tendency to practices of petty corruption. However, in this case, there was lack 
of free deliberation over land governance. This resulted from the chairperson’s structural power over 
land governance, which was based on his ethnic affiliation and perceived powers of sorcery. Most 
villagers were afraid to speak out against his abuses of power and petty corruption to avoid retaliation. 
Several informants said that this fear prevented many villagers from raising their concerns in decision-
making arenas. As a result, when the VNRC told the farmers that only those with land obtained legally 
would be eligible for compensation, the farmers knew they would not be compensated, as nobody had 
ever received land following formal statutory or customary procedures (interview, 28 August 2016). 
Second, the farmers were unhappy with the procedural process for land compensation that the VNRC 
proposed. One VNRC leader noted that, out of sympathy (as they knew that the farmers had no legal 
documentation for their occupancies), the VNRC and the village leadership agreed to compensate one 
hectare of land to each evicted farmer (interview, 28 August 2016). However, at the special farmers’ 
meeting, I learned that the village proposed the one-hectare plan for all villagers – i.e. it was not specific 
to the evicted farmers – as a way to ensure younger villagers could get lands for settlement and 
cultivation (participant observation, 16 January 2017). At the meeting, several farmers lamented that 
even if the VNRC’s plan included them, it was unfair, as many had occupied lands of more than one 
hectare – some had more than 20 hectares of land in the forest. Fair and full compensation is one of the 
fundamental principles of the national land policy (URT 1999). In addition, they said that compensation 
procedures were not followed. Land compensation takes place through the Land Acquisition Act of 
1967, regulated by the Land (Assessment of the Value of Land for Compensation) Regulations of 2001. 
Section 14 of the Act stipulates that land must be assessed before compensation is granted; 
compensation shall be granted for land of equal market value with the consent of the person entitled 
to compensation (URT 1967). And only a qualified land valuer shall conduct the assessment, factoring 
in disturbance allowance, transport allowance, accommodation allowance and loss of profits (URT 
2001). These procedures did not take place and the farmers were not individually informed about 
compensation. 
Third, the farmers distrusted the VNRC over the physical availability of land for compensation. One 
evicted farmer, who used to be in a village committee, knew that the commitment would not materialise 
(interview, 27 August 2016). The farmer said that he knew that during the village land use planning 
stage, no land had been reserved for future uses, i.e. there was no spare land. At the FGD with members 
of the VLUMC, I learned that there was an oversight regarding the spare land. ‘There is no spare land. 
Therefore, for the next generation there would be hardships in the availability of farm fields’, a 
discussant noted (FGD, 11 August 2016). In attempt to resolve this and compensate the farmers, the 
VLUMC proposed to take a forest area that was allocated for firewood collection. The farmers and other 
villagers saw the proposal as problematic as firewood is ‘the single most valuable forest product’ in rural 
Kilosa (Dokken and Angelsen 2015: 205). Removal of the firewood collection unit to create space for 
land compensation would thus result in other episodes of injustice.  
Finally, the farmers expressed their concerns over the political process that the VNRC followed to 
resolve the conflict. When the farmers rejected the written notices, the VNRC went back to the court 
several times. Some farmers were called and expressed their grievances over compensation and how 
the VNRC had failed to fulfil its initial promises and commitments. The magistrate then gave a 
preliminary order that the eviction and its measures should be discussed and decided at the village 
assembly, and the court would use the assembly’s decision to make a ruling, an informant noted 
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(interview, 23 August 2016). As the supreme authority on all matters of general policy-making and 
affairs in the village, the farmers saw the assembly as a space for high-quality deliberation on the 
conflict. As one of the VNRC’s witnesses, the current village chairperson was ordered to convene an 
extraordinary village assembly. Section 103(3) of the Local Government Act allows an extraordinary 
assembly to be convened to ‘discuss and decide upon any matter of extraordinary public importance’ 
(URT 1982: 44). However, the chairperson did not convene the assembly. ‘The current village 
chairperson was also present at the Court and he rejected to convene the assembly for an issue that 
villagers had already agreed since 2012/13’, one VNRC member said (interview, 28 August 2016). 
Instead, the VNRC – with village leadership – summoned the farmers who had rejected the notices. At 
the inquiry, a farmer, when asked why he had not signed the notice, responded: ‘I cannot sign because 
our case is still in the Court. So, I am waiting for the Court ruling’ (participant observation, 15 August 
2016). Another farmer lamented: ‘I remember being at the Court four times. And what I know is that 
the Court has not made a ruling. So, why do you summon me at the village office for the matter that is 
still to be decided at the Court?’ (participant observation, 15 August 2016). 
‘We the farmers want the committee the VNRC and village to adhere to the Court’s order’, one 
farmer said (interview, 23 August 2016). The farmers wanted fresh deliberation over the project 
implementation, believing that issues such as initial project promises, the previous land occupancy 
system, the VNRC’s authority, land compensation and benefits distribution require villagers’ appraisal, 
as several farmers said at their meeting. They wanted their concerns and needs to be recognised in the 
project implementation. For instance, as the VLUP had not set aside spare land, the farmers demanded 
their land claims be legitimised in hopes of changing the VLUP to provide land for them (interview, 23 
August 2016). At the meeting, there was a belief that, as the supreme political authority, the assembly 
would overrule the eviction notices or at least change the VLUP to create space for land compensation, 
as some villagers were disappointed with initial project expectations and perceived that there was an 
unfair distribution of benefits (participant observation, 16 January 2017). 
6  Discussion and conclusions: in pursuit of multidimensional justice 
In this charcoal greening project, people express different notions and claims about justice. The project 
thus highlights a complex mix of interconnected dimensions of justice. There is a primacy of the 
distributive dimension among charcoal producers, VNRC members and members of the village council. 
The centrality of the dimension among local officials is well-documented in justice research that uses 
empirical approaches (e.g. He and Sikor 2015). Often this group receives greening and conservation 
education from TFCG officials, emphasising the project’s goals of producing charcoal sustainably, 
conserving forest resources, generating revenues for the village and sharing benefits collectively. The 
education provided promotes the notion of societal greater good, and disregards risks and costs 
associated with the project implementation to individuals. This group’s justice concern is entrenched in 
how the SCP galvanises village development, a common distributive justice notion among officials in 
conservation interventions (He and Sikor, 2015). Influenced by the initial project expectations and 
promises, villagers who had no land occupancies in the open area forest also express similar distributive 
concerns. Their goal of avoiding coercive development levies, overcoming poverty and improving their 
living standards produce a focus on distributive matters. Thus, their initial overriding concern for 
distributive justice has led them to support the project. This is common in conservation interventions 
that prioritise utilitarian distributive justice conception (e.g. He and Sikor 2015; Fisher et al. 2018).  
On the other hand, villagers who had makazi mashamba and farmlands (farmers) in the old open area 
forest, now the VLFR, frequently raise matters of contextual, procedural and recognitional justice – for 
instance, by demanding consideration of the preceding land allocation system that provided them with 
land occupancies in the forest, respect of their needs for land compensation, and a fresh deliberation 
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over the project implementation. Unlike the above group, this group associates their distributive justice 
with concerns over the other dimensions of justice. I argue that the over-promotion of economic 
dimensions should not occur at the expense of the other justice dimensions, as I discuss below. 
The farmers want their needs be recognised in the SCP implementation. Zafra-Calvo et al. (2017) note 
that recognition is often demanded when some people feel inferior, excluded and invisible. It is 
associated with acknowledgement and respect for differences in values and interests (Dawson et al. 
2018). The farmers assume that recognition of their needs would facilitate their distributive justice, 
considering that the utilitarian distributive logic adopted by the project and VNRC is not materialising 
as most villagers expected. They see the logic as unfolding unfairly since they perceive that only charcoal 
producers and members of the VNRC get bigger shares. They demand equity in the distribution of costs 
and benefits, a common claim wherever there is primacy of the distributive dimension (e.g. Fisher et al. 
2018). They are also troubled with how the VNRC fails to deal with other forms of forest 
‘encroachments’ and ‘invasions’, such as livestock grazing inside the VLFR. Zafra-Calvo et al. (2017) note 
that perceptions over how conservation impacts are shared among social groups are one of the 
qualitative indicators for understanding recognition. Here the farmers’ concern is over how their socio-
economic statuses – they are unable to gain quick access to cash like pastoralists – deny them equitable 
resource access, another common concern in distributive dimension (e.g. Fisher et al. 2018). In 
consequence, they want the system through which they acquired land in the now VLFR be recognised 
and legitimised, hoping that such a process would form a path for changes in the VLUP that would 
provide them with security of tenure. Through this they would avoid being put in a more 
disadvantageous position that the ban and removal notices had put them. 
Their appeal for compensation conveys concerns over prior unequal power relations and mitigation to 
a conservation cost. They are distressed that the VNRC and village leadership brush aside pre-existing 
land governance, which was centred on powers of a former village chairperson, and that the VNRC uses 
the utilitarian distributive justice to dismiss their demands. Their compensation demands expose the 
unfair sharing of conservation burdens that the greening initiative has brought to individuals, as the 
initiative stresses collective benefits. Compensation is thus their mechanism to claim equity in both 
resource access and the distribution of the costs of greening charcoal. In empirical approaches to 
environmental justice, compensation is documented as an effort to mitigate the costs and losses that 
conservation initiatives bring (e.g. He and Sikor 2015). However, as an agent of the utilitarian distributive 
logic, the VNRC disregards prior power dynamics that shape individuals’ capabilities to contest poor land 
governance. The former village chairperson’s perceived ‘higher’ social status as a first-comer and 
husband of a local healer – feared to possess sorcery powers that can harm individuals (Mesaki 1993) – 
deters farmers’ efforts to hold him accountable. 
Furthermore, the farmers raise matters of procedural justice in the project. They hold the VNRC 
accountable for the eviction, poor dispute resolution process and failure to fulfil initial commitments. 
These are some of the elements that define procedural justice (see Table 1). The farmers exhibit strong 
concerns over the initial promise that they could remain in the forest, and how the VNRC and the project 
have failed to fulfil it. Failure to fulfil institutional commitments is a qualitative indicator for lack of 
procedural justice (Dawson et al. 2017). The farmers assume that if the SCP officials talked about having 
accumulated forest patches to make the VLFR, then it is possible to have cultivation amid Miombo 
conservation. Chidumayo (2017) shows that Miombo woodlands are products of successive cycles of 
cutting, clearing and burning for cultivation and livestock grazing over thousands of years. Besides, 
recent research confirms their assumption, as Wintle et al. (2019) shows that even small patches of 
natural habitat play a vital role in conservation. Moreover, the farmers are concerned with the refusal 
to convene an extraordinary village assembly, as the court instructed. In Tanzanian village land politics, 
the assembly is a political platform for full and effective participation and the deliberation of all relevant 
actors in decision-making (Greco 2016). Their dissatisfaction with how the VNRC and village leadership 
ignore the court’s decision to grant the assembly authority to deliberate over the conflict creates 
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discontent over how decision-making unfolds, an indicator of inequitable procedural justice (Zafra-Calvo 
et al., 2017). 
This analysis goes further than discussing overlapping notions of justice (e.g. He and Sikor 2015) or 
interrelations of the notions (e.g. Fisher et al. 2018) to highlight that social justice in rural areas is a 
complex mix of poor governance and variegated responses to conservation initiatives due to locally 
changing justice claims and notions. Thus, the disregard by the project and the VNRC of the preceding 
land allocation system and the former chairperson’s abuse of power highlights the importance of 
context. Its illegality presents a situation where victims of his abuse, i.e. the farmers, cannot claim legal 
land occupation on either statutory or customary bases. Recent reviews of PES literature show that 
contextual factors such as prior governance compliance, property rights regime, inequalities and 
resource struggles matter in determining the outcomes of PES interventions (Börner et al. 2017). For 
the green economy interventions that target environmental resources for efficient use in sustainable 
production, attention to past and present social, governance and cultural contexts, power imbalances 
and variegated capabilities of individuals to participate and influence decisions, is therefore 
fundamental. 
These findings are in line with Martin (2017): attaining equitable conservation interventions is more 
than just considering livelihood benefits and the greater societal good as crucial. This narrow utilitarian 
conception produces a partial understanding of conservation impacts that are locally valued or 
contested. It also precludes a clear understanding of substantive justice considerations and the 
multifaceted relations within societies and between people and natural resources, thus concealing 
forms of injustices that are not expressed in economic terms (Schlosberg 2007; Walker 2010). Like other 
critical analysts, I do not disregard livelihood benefits and related distributive concerns. I rather 
emphasise that livelihood benefits alone cannot influence socially just conservation, as the benefits and 
their distributive patterns should be thoroughly understood in relation to other locally valued interests 
of fair capability, procedure and recognition. My analysis of the SCP’s conservation–farming conflict 
therefore underlines how the project’s utilitarian distributive justice concerns contradict some local 
contexts and justice claims, leading to farmers’ removal (with several rejecting removal notices) and 
their covert resistance to the project. Despite social justice and consideration of critical livelihoods being 
key features of the ‘green economy’ discourse (UNEP 2011), in practice, its aligned interventions repeat 
the tendencies of reproducing social injustices for the greater good, like the older ICDP approaches. By 
sticking with the one-dimensional utilitarian distributive conception, the green economy agenda thus 
offers little insight into the way in which concerns for locally valued interests and aspirations for fair 
procedure and recognition would produce socially just conservation. 
Broadly, I have accentuated the analytical value of the multidimensional justice framework in 
understanding the evolutions of resource use conflicts and how to resolve them by paying particular 
attention to pluralistic conceptions of what matters and what does not to rural people. I argue that 
conflicts arising in the implementation of conservation interventions result from differences in justice 
notions. I highlight social injustices that might prevail in Tanzanian villages containing unreserved forests 
on village lands, i.e. open area forests, as many villagers still lack planned land uses (Huggins 2018). 
These areas offer spare lands for future communal and individual uses, bringing them in conflict with 
the green economy agenda that puts forest protection at the heart of the agenda. This makes attention 
to understanding people’s justice claims and notions, and to prior historical and cultural contexts of 
resource use and governance, essential. I thus argue that considering people’s multiple justice 
expressions, in relation to past and present uneven socio-cultural and political conditions, exposes 
locally valued and contested conservation impacts. It is about illustrating how different individuals and 
groups experience justice and argue their own justice claims as individuals or collectively. This approach 
allows for richer understandings of their responses to the green economy-aligned conservation 
interventions and their outcomes. In practice, these understandings can guide more equitable and just 
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conservation, especially as the interventions increasingly target environmental resources critical for 
rural livelihoods.  
 
Appendix A: List of participants and methods 
No. Type of participant Method Date Place of participation 
1 District forest official Expert interview 30.05.2016 Kilosa 
2 SCP project official Expert interview 31.05.2016 Kilosa 
3 Sub-village chairmen FGD 09.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
4 VNRC FGD 10.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
5 Charcoal producers’ association FGD 10.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
6 VLUMC FGD 11.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
7 Ordinary villager, elderly male Informant interview 12.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
8 Ordinary villager, elderly male Informant interview 12.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
9 Ordinary villager, youth male Informant interview 13.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
10 Ordinary villager, adult female Informant interview 13.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
11 Ordinary villager, elderly Informant interview 13.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
12 Ordinary villager, adult female Informant interview 13.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
13 Special village inquiry meeting Job shadowing 15.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
14 Ordinary villager, elderly female Informant interview 15.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
15 Ordinary villager, elderly male Informant interview 15.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
16 Project’s workshop with charcoal 
makers 
Participant observation 16.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
17 Ordinary villager, elderly male Informant interview 16.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
18 Former village leader/charcoal 
maker 
Informant interview 17.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
19 Ordinary villager, adult male Informant interview 17.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
20 Ordinary villager, adult male Informant interview 17.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
21 Ordinary villager, adult female Informant interview 17.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
22 Village leader Informant interview 18.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
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23 Ordinary villager, adult male Informant interview 18.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
24 Allocation of charcoal plots Job shadowing 20.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
25 Village leader Informant interview 22.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
26 Village leader Informant interview 22.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
27 Ordinary villager, adult male Informant interview 22.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
28 Former VNRC member Informant interview 23.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
29 VNRC member Informant interview 23.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
30 Ordinary villager, adult male Informant interview 24.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
31 VLUMC member Informant interview 24.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
32 Former forest officer Informant interview 25.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
33 VNRC member Informant interview 25.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
34 Suspended village leader Informant interview 25.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
35 Charcoal maker Informant interview 26.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
36 Village leader Informant interview 26.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
37 Village leader Informant interview 26.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
38 Former VNRC/charcoal maker Informant interview 27.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
39 Charcoal maker Informant interview 27.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
40 VNRC member Informant interview 28.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
41 VLUMC member/charcoal maker Informant interview 28.08.2016 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
42 SCP technical adviser Expert interview 06.09.2016 Dar es Salaam 
43 SDC official Expert interview 07.09.2016 Dar es Salaam 
44 Internal farmers’ committee 
meeting 
Participant observation 16.01.2017 Ulaya Mbuyuni 
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Over the last 30 years, Tanzania has taken different  
policy approaches towards the conservation of forests. 
Intriguingly, from the earlier integrated conservation and 
development approach to the ‘newer’ green economy, the 
idea that providing livelihood benefits is a key strategy for 
achieving conservation effectiveness has dominated. This 
one-dimensional conception of what ‘local people’ value 
and why precludes a clear understanding of substantive 
social justice considerations – what is being contested,  
why and by whom – when conflicts arise in policy 
implementation settings. Using a green economy project 
that addresses charcoal-driven forest loss in Kilosa, the 
paper examines a conflict between forest conservation and 
farming, and studies the variegated notions of justice that 
farmers express in relation to the conflict. 
This paper builds upon a developing strand in the political 
ecology literature, that of empirical analyses of rural people’s 
conceptions of justice in environmental conservation, to 
demonstrate the analytical and practical values of a 
multidimensional justice framework. Its main contribution 
lies in illustrating how the framework can help to assess and 
reframe environmental interventions, going beyond one-
dimensional conceptions, to focus attention on the diverse 
ways in which justice can be recognised or denied, at 
different levels and in different ways, for different groups of 
people. Particularly, it highlights that context matters, as 
despite the distributional ‘success’ of the project, 
disregarded concerns over procedural dimensions and the 
recognition of justice led to farmer evictions, covert 
resistance and continued struggles over land compensation. 
This paper therefore underlines that being attentive to a 
range of justice dimensions can reveal locally valued and 
contested aspects of conservation, and can guide more 
equitable and more just environmental conservation.
